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Banks have historically provided mutual insurance against asset risk, where the insurance arrange-
ment itself was characterized by limited enforcement. This paper shows that a non-trivial interaction
between asset and liquidity risk plays a crucial role in shaping optimal banking arrangements in
the presence of limited enforcement. We ﬁnd that liquidity shocks are essential for the provision of
insurance against asset shocks, as they mitigate interbank enforcement problems. These enforce-
ment problems generate endogenous aggregate uncertainty as investment allocations depend upon
the joint distribution of shocks. Paradoxically, a negative correlation between liquidity and asset
shocks ameliorates enforcement limitations and facilitates interbank cooperation.
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There are numerous historic and contemporaneous examples of banks entering into
arrangements to provide mutual insurance against asset shocks aﬀecting their assets and
liabilities. Surprisingly, many of these interbank insurance arrangements permitted member
banks to exit so as to avoid making ex-post insurance transfers to other banks. Even more
puzzling, however, is the observation that sometimes ex post transfers between banks did take
place, even when the bank making the transfer could have avoided the payment by exiting
the arrangement.1
These observations lead to the problem of identifying the fundamental factors that are
important for the understanding of interbank relationships. Beyond this problem, lies the
more imminent question of how these factors interact and whether this interaction is able
to explain the speciﬁc features of interbank cooperation observed in the examples described
above.
In this paper, we advocate two fundamental determinants of interbank relationships,
liquidity and default risk that individual banks face. Assuming that arrangements between
banks cannot be enforced we show that the interaction between these two forces can account
for the empirical examples we have referred to above. This allows us to conclude that - in the
absence of a regulatory framework that ensures enforcement - the interaction among banks
is driven by risk sharing through a joint exchange of services consisting of liquidity provision
and insurance against non-performing asset portfolios.
Our model builds upon a basic investment ﬁnancing problem. To ﬁnance proﬁtable
1Calomiris (1990) and English (1993) both discuss historic and contemporaneous examples for the United
States. Gorton (1985) discusses the behaviour of American clearinghouses in the National Banking era, while
Williamson (1989) discusses the evidence for Canadian banking.projects, borrowers have to seek funds from lenders who are endowed with an investment good,
but who do not have direct access to proﬁtable investment opportunities. The relationship
between these groups is complicated by the possibility of default by borrowers and stochastic
liquidity needs of lenders. Speciﬁcally, the repayment of investment funds can only be enforced
via the threat of seizure of a risky collateral good with which the borrower is endowed. This
feature leads to optimal ﬁnancing arrangements which feature collateralized debt and non-
performing loans due to strategic default by borrowers2.
Preference shocks induce stochastic liquidity needs for lenders. Lenders with liquidity
needs will seek to withdraw funds, thereby terminating investment projects prior to comple-
tion. Financing on the investor’s side will then take the form of a deposit contract. Thus,
the possibility of default by borrowers and stochastic liquidity needs of lenders give rise to
arrangements which resemble a bank.
To study interactions between banks, we replicate our basic environment and assume
that each group of lenders and borrowers are spatially separated3. This leads to a lack of ex-
ante diversiﬁcation. Thus, the fundamental force driving bank interaction is a desire to reduce
individual risk. Arrangements to share risk, however, have to be self-enforcing: Individual
banks are unable to commit and are free to renege ex-post on prior agreements.4
In this environment optimal banking arrangements are shaped in a crucial way by the
2The empirical literature on banking failures has increasingly stressed the importance of shocks to the
asset portfolios of banks. Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Calomiris and Mason (1997) and Schumacher (2000),
among others, ﬁnd that banks faced runs and failed as a consequence of sharp declines in asset positions
rather than pure liquidity shocks to depositors. Since most of bank intermediated ﬁnance takes the form of
collateralized debt, we model shocks to a bank’s assets as the default of borrowers.
3Spatial separation is stressed throughout the banking literature and captures the observation that lending
tends to be regionally or functionally specialized and, hence, not fully diversiﬁed.
4The enforcement friction is introduced into the model to capture the ability of banks to "freely exit"
interbank arrangements. On the other hand, limited enforcement between banks allows us to study the basic
interaction between the two risk factors abstracting completely from the interference of regulatory institutions.
2interaction of liquidity shocks and asset shocks arising from the default risk of borrowers.
Optimal contracts feature a form of deposit insurance as an optimal response to weaken the
eﬀects of asset shocks on the level of investment. We show that, although liquidity shocks
do not provide a motivation for insurance among banks, the provision of liquidity plays an
essential role in oﬀsetting enforcement limitations. In the absence of liquidity shocks, limited
enforcement implies that banks do not insure one another against collateral shocks. With
liquidity shocks, the enforcement problem is partially mitigated, so that banks enter into
agreements to insure one another. In other words, the possible exclusion from interbank
lending serves as a threat to induce ex post participation in insurance arrangements.
The fact that limited enforcement between banks inﬂuences the potential for insur-
ance is not surprising. What is not at ﬁrst obvious, however, is the critical role that the joint
distribution of asset and liquidity shocks plays in determining the extent of insurance. Para-
doxically, a negative correlation between liquidity and asset shocks ameliorates enforcement
limitations and facilitates cooperation between banks. Moreover, since the level of investment
depends upon the joint distribution of shocks, our model endogenously generates aggregate
uncertainty. Thus this paper also provides a contribution to the theoretical literature on
limited enforcement, as it illustrates how the interaction of purely idiosyncratic shocks in the
presence of enforcement limitations can generate aggregate uncertainty.
Our model fuses two distinct strands of the banking literature. A considerable body
of work has built upon the seminal contributions of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) and analyzed the implications of stochastic liquidity needs for banking structures.
The second branch that we build upon explores the role played by asset risk in banking
arrangements. In particular, we closely follow the model of Kocherlakota (1999) and model
3asset shocks as collateral risk to study optimal insurance arrangements related to these shocks.
The theoretical literature on interbank relationships has concentrated mainly on two
broad topics. One branch has focused on the beneﬁts of interbank markets in dealing with
liquidity shocks, and investigates whether these markets can achieve an optimal diversiﬁcation
of liquidity risk.5 The second branch has investigated the potential for contagious eﬀects in
the banking sector via links between banks and discusses optimal regulatory responses.6
Our paper diﬀers from the existing literature on interbank relationships in several
respects. Whereas other models concentrate on particular eﬀects caused by one type of
the shocks, we analyze a model where stochastic liquidity needs and asset risk interact in
a fundamental way to shape interbank relationships. Moreover, we restrict attention upon
the basic trade-oﬀ implied by the two sources of risk leaving out informational frictions,
and incentive problems such as moral hazard. Finally, our paper links the recent emerging
literature on enforcement frictions to the banking literature and, in particular, to the question
of interbank relationships.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the environment, concen-
trating particularly on the contractual framework and the enforcement frictions. We proceed
in section 3 by formally setting up the problem and deﬁning the concept of a contract. Sec-
5Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994) demonstrate that interbank lending
potentially improves welfare, but asymmetric information in this market reduces the sharing of liquidity risk.
Chari (1989) shows that well-functioning interbank markets can substantially reduce the risk of bank runs
and subsequent bank failures.
6Rochet and Tirole (1996) analyze interbank lending with moral hazard and peer monitoring among banks.
They discuss optimal central bank policies such as bailouts taking into account possible negative eﬀects on peer
monitoring and potential contagious eﬀects arising from interbank lending. In another contribution, Allen and
Gale (2000) link organizational aspects of interbank lending markets to the possibility of contagious liquidity
shocks. Furthermore, Freixas et. al. (1999) generalize the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework to include
links across banks caused by spatial relocation of depositors. They identify optimal lending behaviour across
banks and discuss whether contagion can occur and what policy responses can prevent this.
4tion 4 contains the main analysis: optimal contracts are characterized and the interaction
between both types of shocks investigated. Section 5 discusses our results.
2. The Environment
The economy consists of N ≥ 3 identical islands. On each island there is a continuum
of two types of agents, denoted as borrowers and lenders, each having unit mass. The economy
lasts for a single period divided into three stages labeled t =0 ,1,2.
A. Lenders
Lenders on each island i are endowed with a single unit of a consumption good and a
storage technology yielding a gross return of one. Let ˜ θi be a random variable with support
Θ ⊂ (0,1) and denote a realization of ˜ θi by θi. Lenders can be of two types: whereas type 1
lenders consume only at t =1 , lenders of type 2 consume exclusively at t =2 . Preferences
are state-dependent on ˜ θi where the random variable ˜ θi represents an island-speciﬁc liquidity
shock as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). One can interpret the realization θi (1 − θi)a st h e
fraction of lenders on island i having to consume at stage t =1(t =2 ). Formally, preferences
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c1
L,i if type 1 and realization is θi
c2
L,i if type 2 and realization is θi
,
where ct
L,i is the amount consumed by type t lenders in stage t.
Ex-ante preferences are given by E[uL(c1
L,i,c 2
L,i;θi)] ≡ E˜ θi[˜ θic1
L,i +( 1− ˜ θi)c2
L,i].
5B. Borrowers
Borrowers are endowed with an investment project and a unit of an indivisible collat-
eral good. To initiate the project an amount x>0 of the consumption good must be invested
at t =0 . Projects are of a long-term nature: Once funds are withdrawn from a project, the
project is stopped. Therefore, to realize returns from a project, funds have to be continuously
invested in the project. The project payoﬀ is given by min{Rx,R} units of the consumption
good at t =2 ,w h e r eR>1 is deterministic.
The collateral good is agent-speciﬁc: only the speciﬁc borrower endowed with the
collateral good derives utility from it. Let ˜ ν be a random variable with support {0,V},
representing a shock to the value of the borrower’s collateral good. The distribution of ˜ ν for
all borrowers on island i is characterized by the random variable ˜ πi having support Π ⊂ (0,1),
where πi is a particular realization of ˜ πi. The realization πi is the fraction of borrowers on
island i with valuable collateral (i.e. ν = V ).
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where cν
B,i is the amount of the consumption good and h denotes the collateral good
consumed by the borrower. We assume that for any realization of ˜ πi a law of large numbers
holds. Ex-ante preferences are then given by E[uB(cV
B,i,c 0
B,i;πi)] ≡ E˜ πi[˜ πi(cV




We construct the underlying probability space as an urn experiment. Consider an
urn containing N balls each labeled with a diﬀerent value of π ∈ (0,1). A second urn




Π = {π1,...,πj,...,πN} such that π1 < ... < πN7. For each island, one ball is drawn
independently from each urn without replacement. A realization of the two shocks across
islands is a speciﬁc assignment of draws from the two urns to the N islands.
Let S denote the set of states of nature. It consists of all possible assignments of N ele-
ments of Θ and the N elements in Π to the N islands. A state s is an N-vector of ordered pairs
(π,θ),w h e r et h eith component represents the realization of ˜ θi and ˜ πi for island i.F o r m a l l y ,
S = {(πi,θi)N
i=1 | πi ∈ Π,πi 6= πk,θi ∈ Θ, for all θ
j ∈ Θ, there exists a unique i s.t. θi =
θ
j}.A s t a t e s for the economy is thus given by a particular realized joint distribution of
both shocks across islands. There are (N!)2 elements in S.W ed e ﬁne a probability measure
U over S by putting equal mass (1/N!)2 on each element of S. Then, the probability space
{S,F,U} represents the uncertainty for the economy, where F is the σ-algebra consisting of
all subsets of S.8
D. Enforceability
Contracts are subject to several restrictions on enforcement. Lenders have the option
of investing their endowment in either the storage technology or the investment project, and
of withdrawing their funds from the investment project at t =1 . Hence, the contract has to
7Dropping the assumption that the elements of Π are diﬀerent does not alter the results, but does com-
plicate the exposition.
8Modeling uncertainty in this fashion simpliﬁes the analysis and allows for a cleaner line of reasoning. All
the results of this paper carry over to more general formulations of uncertainty.
7insure their participation in the contract at all stages. Second, borrowers on each island have
the option of not repaying the lender and consuming the project returns. However, we assume
that the collateral good is subject to seizure by the lending side. Therefore, the contracting
parties face an ex-post intra-island participation constraint on the borrowing side. Finally,
if the contract speciﬁes any inter-island transfers, it must be the case that each island as a
whole has an incentive to honor the contract ex-post (inter-island participation). We assume
that each island makes its decision on honoring the contract at the beginning of t =1 .9
E. Timing
All information is publicly known by all agents at the stage it is realized. We denote
the initial and ﬁnal investment decision by lenders on island i by x0
i and x1
i(s), respectively.
The time structure of the economy is:
Stage 0:
Lenders and borrowers agree on a contract. Lenders advance x0
i to the borrowers on
each island.
Stage 1:
For each island, the shocks πi and θi are realized and each individual lender learns
his/her type. While the fraction of borrowers with valuable collateral is known at this stage,
the individual realization for each speciﬁcb o r r o w e ri snot known. Islands as a whole decide
whether to exit the contract. Then, lenders make desired withdrawals x0
i −x1
i(s) conditional
on the realizations of the shocks and consume or store them for consumption in stage 2.
9As later analysis will clarify, participation of islands at t =2can always be assured, since inter-island
transfers can be secured via forfeiting the right to seize collateral in favor of another island. It is, however,
important that the participation decision of the islands is made before all other decisions at date t = 1.
8Stage 2:
The realization of ν becomes publicly known for each individual borrower. Borrow-
ers on each island decide whether to walk away or not. Project returns are realized and
consumption takes place.
3. The Contracting Problem
A. Optimal Contracts
We study an optimal contracting problem under uncertainty subject to enforcement
limitations. Contracts specify state-dependent allocations and investment levels across all N
islands and are written before the random variables ˜ πi and ˜ θi are realized for each island. The
set of possible contracts are constrained by the frictions arising in both the borrower-lender
and the inter-island relationships.























i=1,w h e r eδ
ν
i(s) ∈ {0,1}
for all s ∈ S.
The functions δ
ν
i(s) ∈ {0,1} specify whether the borrower retains title to the collateral.
If the borrower does not retain title to the collateral good, he cannot consume it in stage 2.
When solving for an optimal inter-island contract we consider a Pareto problem. The
objective function assigns all surplus to borrowers, and is given by the summation of the

















Lenders have the option of withdrawing their funds and utilizing the storage technol-




L,i(s) ≥ 1 (2)
c
2
L,i(s) ≥ 1. (3)
Borrowers on each island also have the option of walking away, albeit at the cost of










This constraint compares the expected value of honoring withdrawal requests at stage
t =1with the value of continuing investment at the original level.11.
There are two diﬀerent borrower participation constraints - one for each realization of













10This problem assumes implicitly that lenders have no bargaining power, which is equivalent to assuming
that the lending side is perfectly competitive.
11It is clear that lenders would seize collateral in the case of borrowers not honoring the lenders’ withdrawal
requests, since seizure provides the only penalty for deviation. For notational clarity we do not include this
decision in the speciﬁcation of the constraint, since we will rule out early default by borrowers.
10At stage t =2 ,i fc o l l a t e r a lh a sv a l u eV , the borrower weighs the value of consumption
under the contract and possible collateral ownership against the possibility of consuming the
returns. On the other hand, if borrowers have valueless collateral, they will always choose to
default unless the contract oﬀers the entire project return for consumption.
Contracts must satisfy resource feasibility at stages t =1and t =2 .T h e r e s o u r c e
constraints for each stage are aggregate constraints across islands and, hence, do not have to


















































A key ingredient of our model is the inter-island enforcement restriction. Each island
has the ability to not honor the contract at t =1and resort to an autarkic contract. Let W A
i
be the value of this autarkic contract for island i at stage t =1and denote the value of the
contract for island i by WC
i . The inter-island participation constraint is then given by
W
C














B,i.T h e ﬁnal constraints are









B,i(s) ≥ 0,1 ≥ x
0
i ≥ 0. (11)
Definition 2. An optimal inter-island contract is a contract that solves the following max-
imization problem (P1):
max 1 s.to 7, 8 and s.to. 2 - 6, 9 - 11 for all islands i =1 ,...,N.
For every island i, the autarkic contract is an optimal island-speciﬁc contract for the
particular island considered. The value of walking away from the inter-island contract, W A
i ,
is then given by the sum of consumption allocations speciﬁed in the optimal island-speciﬁc
contract. The next two deﬁnitions clarify these concepts.













i(s),w h e r eδ
ν
i(s) ∈ {0,1}
for all s ∈ S.
Definition 4. An optimal island-speciﬁc contract for island i is a contract that solves the
following maximization problem (P2):
max 1s . t o2-8 ,1 0 ,1 1f o ri s l a n di
where N =1 .
Finally, it is helpful for our analysis to deﬁne a related concept that refers to an optimal
inter-island contract where islands do not have the possibility to walk away from the contract
12at t =1 . We refer to this as the case with full inter-island enforcement, which is essentially
the maximization problem (P1) without constraint (9). Formally, we have
Definition 5. An optimal inter-island contract with full inter-island enforcement is a con-
tract that solves the following maximization problem (P3):
max 1 s.to 7, 8 and s.to. 2 - 6, 10, 11 for all islands i =1 ,...,N.
B. Banks as Optimal Contracts
The optimal contract characterized in the next section captures several key features
which are associated in the theoretical literature with the institution of a bank. It explicitly
contains both a deposit contract and a debt contract feature. The deposit contract feature
arises from the fact that any optimal contract includes initial investment for all lenders with
the option to withdraw funds at later stages. This withdrawal can be made for two reasons:
either to meet the personal liquidity needs of lenders or to liquidate investment on the island
in response to information about negative asset shocks.12 The asset side of the contract
resembles collateralized debt13.
We interpret the optimal contract as an optimal banking arrangement where the con-
tract speciﬁcation for each island is identiﬁed as an individual bank. Banks are island-speciﬁc
and possible inter-island transfers occur between island-speciﬁc banks. The inter-island en-
forcement restriction, equation 9, is interpreted as the ability of individual banks to exit
12The formulation of the participation constraints rules out suspension schemes for banks. Therefore, the
contract has not only a deposit but also a demandable debt feature. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) emphasize that
demandable debt is the crucial feature that characterizes banks. They also provide evidence that suspension
schemes were only used by the banking system as a whole, but not by individual banks, thus empirically
supporting this particular feature.
13Although the debt feature of the contract is not obvious, a simple and for our purposes inessential
extension would make this feature explicit. Kocherlakota (1998) uses asymmetric information with respect
to the collateral value to generate more clearly simple debt as the optimal contract.
13interbank arrangements. To be able to identify speciﬁcs of these interbank arrangements
further, we deﬁne two concepts, deposit insurance and interbank lending.
Definition 6. A deposit insurance system is a transfer scheme {Ti}N
i=1, Ti : S −→ I R,f o r
all i =1 ,2,...,N s.th.
1. ∃ ˆ π ∈ [0,1],s . t h .Ti ≥ 0 for πi < ˆ π and Ti < 0 for some πi > ˆ π
2.
PN
i=1 Ti ≥ 0.
Deposit insurance systems involve transfers from solvent to insolvent banks subject
to feasibility restrictions. In our framework the parameter ˆ π plays the role of determining
solvency of banks. The ﬁrst feature of our transfer scheme captures the essential nature
of deposit insurance, whereas the second one refers to a feasibility restriction: Net transfers
between banks have to be non-negative, which rules out systems that depend on the provision
of funds to the banking system from outside such as bail-outs. Moreover, the transfer system
has to satisfy all the enforcement and feasibility constraints of the inter-island contracting
problems, since deposit insurance is analyzed here as a particular feature of optimal contracts
between banks.
Definition 7. A contract features interbank lending if ∃ i s.th. x1
i(s) > 1 − θi for some
i =1 ,...,N.
Our deﬁnition refers to the feature of one bank freeing up funds to provide liquidity to
another bank. This enables the bank receiving the funds to maintain the original investment
level and to avoid termination of some of its projects due to liquidity demand by lenders.
Hence, it formalizes the occurrence of short-term lending between banks to obtain liquidity.
144. Optimal Contracts
A. Optimal Island-Speciﬁc Contracts
We begin our analysis of eﬃcient arrangements among islands by studying the bench-
mark case of the autarkic contract for a single island. This problem is of use both in specifying
the value of the walk away option islands have and in understanding the driving forces in
inter-island contracts. Prior to characterizing the optimal contract, we introduce the following
assumption which we maintain throughout the paper. All proofs are given in the appendix.
Assumption 1. minπi∈Π πiV ≥ R.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1. holds and δ
V
i (s)=1for all i =1 ,...,N. Then, any
optimal contract speciﬁes x0
i =1 .
Assumption 1. simpliﬁes the analysis considerably and avoids the problem that it
might be optimal for lenders not to invest at all at stage t =0 14. It implies that the expected
cost of defaulting at stage t =1exceeds the expected gain. Lemma 1. thus implies that all
liquidation requests by lenders at t =1will be honored.
At t =0 , lenders and borrowers on the island agree on a contract that takes into
account only the possible realizations of the shock on their island. The optimal investment
and consumption levels are characterized as follows.
14This assumption is equivalent to allowing for contracts that specify only ﬁnal investment levels for stage
t = 1, but do so at the contracting stage t =0without handing over the investment funds. Projects are
then initiated as soon as borrowers receive the investment. We, however, chose the more general formulation
to generate a basic deposit feature within the contract which enables us to interpret our results in light of
the literature on banking. Early commitment of funds without actual physical investment taking place is a
common feature of many projects. An example from the banking sector would be the provision of credit lines
or the declaration of an intention to fund a particular project which ties at least partially the funds to the
project in question.
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1 − θi if πi ≥ ¯ π
0 if πi < ¯ π
,
where ¯ π =1 /R.
Corollary 1. Optimal consumption levels for island i are given by
c
t
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The investment allocations speciﬁed above help to illustrate one of the driving forces
of the model. The realized value of the collateral shock determines whether or not lenders
leave their funds in the investment project, or choose to liquidate the bank. This decision
is characterized by a cut-oﬀ rule: if the collateral shock is not too bad (i.e. πi > ¯ π), funds
are only withdrawn for liquidity purposes. All remaining funds stay invested at date t =1 .
However, if there is a bad realization of the collateral shock, all funds are withdrawn and
liquidation occurs. This outcome is socially suboptimal in the sense that projects which are
terminated would yield a higher rate of return than the storage technology.
Corollary 2. For maxθi∈Θ θi → 0, x1
i(s) → 1 for all πi ≥ ¯ π.
16It is worth emphasizing that, in the island-speciﬁc contract, the interaction between
liquidity and asset shocks is trivial. As Corollary 2. shows, liquidity shocks do not directly
aggravate the detrimental nature of these factors, but indirectly inﬂuence the amount of
funds available for investment projects. Liquidity shocks provide a mere scaling eﬀect that
reﬂects the inﬂuence of withdrawals to satisfy consumption for early lenders. The liquidation
decision at t =1is independent of θi, and depends only the realization of the asset shock πi.
However, liquidity shocks, by reducing investment, lead to lower output and consumption by
borrowers.
B. Optimal Inter-Island Contracts with Full Enforcement
We proceed now by characterizing the optimal contract with full inter-island enforce-
ment. To simplify notation we deﬁne three constant integers, M, L and K. The constant
M speciﬁes the number of islands having a realization of πi ≥ ¯ π.T h ei n t e g e rL stands for
the overall liquidity needs in the economy. Finally, K will summarize the maximal extent of
insurance against the asset shock in the absence of liquidity needs. Its deﬁnition relies on the
fact that project returns can only be extracted - and used for transfers - from borrowers with
valuable collateral.15
Assumption 2. Let π1 <. . .<πN
16. Assume there exist M,L, and K ∈ I N s.th.
1. M =# {πi|πiR ≥ 1}
2. L = E(θi)N =
PN
i=1 θi
15Constraints (2) and (3) imply that lenders must receive at least their initial endowment, while - by
constraint (6) - no funds can be extracted from borrowers with a realization of ν =0 . Hence, funds can be
extracted only from borrowers with valuable collateral.
16This assumption is innocuous, as the optimal contract is anonymous in that it does not depend upon
which island receives which pair of shocks (πj,θ
k),a n ds i m p l i ﬁes the presentation of our analysis.
173.
P
{i|i>K}(πiR − 1) = 0.
Proposition 2. The investment levels at t =1for the optimal contract with full inter-island
enforcement depend on E(θi) and the distribution of {πi}N
i=1, but are independent of the state
s.
The optimal total investment level is given by
PN
i=1 x1
i(s)=N − max{K,L} and ﬁnal
investment on the individual islands is characterized by
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Corollary 3. If K ≥ L every optimal inter-island contract with full inter-island enforce-
ment features interbank lending and deposit insurance. If L>K , optimal inter-island
contract feature interbank lending or deposit insurance, or both.
Proposition 2. speciﬁes the extent to which the economy is able to achieve full in-
vestment of all resources after accounting for liquidity needs. Since total welfare is strictly
increasing in the number of projects funded, it is (socially) optimal to fund as many projects
as possible. Case (ii) of the proposition considers situations where liquidity needs are ex-
tremely high. Here, insurance against asset shocks interferes with liquidity provision. While
the optimal investment allocations are not unique, the aggregate investment level is unique
18and is determined solely by overall liquidity needs. For case (i) liquidity shocks are not so
extreme as to interfere with insurance against asset shocks. In this case, it is optimal to liq-
uidate islands with the worst collateral shocks ﬁrst to pay the early withdrawers. This allows
one to continue all investment projects on islands with the most favorable collateral shock
or, equivalently, with the highest return that can be extracted on average from borrowers.
A maximum amount of transfers is then available to subsidize projects on other islands that
would otherwise not have been undertaken.
For both cases, only the distribution of collateral shocks across islands is important
for the allocation of investment funds. Corollary 3. emphasizes the key advantages of an
aggregate contract including all islands: One is able to transfer resources from islands with
high collateral values to islands with bad realizations of the collateral shock independent
of the realizations of the liquidity shock. Hence, the economy is not exposed to aggregate
uncertainty, since the overall investment levels do not depend on the joint distribution of the
shocks.
Interbank lending is an essential feature of the contract, as it allows the insurance
scheme to operate independently of the distribution of liquidity shocks across islands. With-
out this feature, an insurance scheme would have to take into account that islands are hit by
diﬀerent liquidity shocks, potentially reducing the magnitude of insurance.
Corollary 4. For maxθi∈Θ θi → 0, x1
i(s) → 1 for all i s.th. πi > πK.
As in the island-speciﬁc contract, there is a trivial interaction between liquidity and
collateral shocks. Liquidity shocks per se are inessential for the possibility of deposit insur-
ance, and their realized value merely inﬂuences the aggregate level of investment. Corollary 4.
19shows that, as liquidity needs approach 0, insurance against collateral shocks is not aﬀected.
In the next section we demonstrate that with limited enforcement between islands, not only
the joint distribution of both shocks matters, but also that the presence of liquidity shocks
are imperative for the feasibility of deposit insurance.
C. Optimal Inter-Island Contracts
In the presence of limited inter-island enforcement, individual islands will honor the
contract only if they receive at least the ex-post value of autarky. Islands with realizations of
πi such that πiR<1 always ﬁnd it optimal to stay within the contractual arrangement, as
any contract implicitly speciﬁes non-negative transfers for these islands. For all other islands,
however, the ex-post participation constraint cannot be neglected.
Suppose an inter-island contract sets x0
i =1for each island. If an island i with πiR ≥ 1
exits an inter-island contract at stage t =1before withdrawals are announced, the best it can
do on its own is to implement the optimal island-speciﬁc contract as of stage t =1 .T h u s ,
given x0
i =1 , the value of autarky WA
i (s) for this island is the overall value of the optimal
island-speciﬁc contract or
R(1 − θi)+θi + V πi. (12)
Whenever an optimal inter-island contract involves deposit insurance, only borrowers
with valuable collateral can be taxed to ﬁnance the transfer scheme. Using Corollary 1.,
overall utility for these borrowers after transfers is given by
πi(c
V
B,i(s)+V )=( πiR − 1)x
1
i(s)+Ti(s)+πiV , (13)
where Ti(·) is the total transfer extracted from island i. The value of an optimal
20inter-island contract WC
i is then given by
1+( πiR − 1)x
1









Using equations (12) and (14), the inter-island enforcement constraint (9) can be
rewritten as
−Ti(s) ≤ θi(R − 1) + (x
1
i(s) − 1)(R − 1).
The extent of deposit insurance is also limited by the fact that enforcement of the contract
with each borrower on each island is also limited. This implies that no more than x1
i(s)(πiR−
1)/πi per borrower with valuable collateral can be extracted. The next lemma characterizes
the ex-post inter-island participation constraint 9 in terms of the feasible transfer Ti(·) that
can be implicitly imposed by an optimal inter-island contract.
Lemma 2. Deposit insurance is feasible for an inter-island contract, if it satisﬁes
−Ti(s) ≤ min{θi(R − 1) + (x
1
i(s) − 1)(R − 1),(πiR − 1)x
1
i(s)}
for any i s.th. πi > ¯ π and Ti(s) ≥ 0 otherwise.
The next result characterizes total investment for the optimal inter-island contract in
the presence of enforcement problems among islands.
Proposition 3. The investment functions at t =1for the optimal inter-island contract
depend on E(θi) and the joint distribution s.





i(s) ≤ N − L. (15)
The Proposition illustrates how three factors inﬂuence the optimal inter-island con-
tract: the overall size of liquidity needs in the economy; the importance of liquidity needs
relative to collateral risk; and the speciﬁc realization of the state s. Limited enforcement
among islands potentially reduces total investment. Whenever it reduces total investment,
as demonstrated below, overall liquidity needs are not too high and the joint distribution of
shocks across islands prohibits the extraction of maximal transfers from islands with favorable
asset shocks. We proceed by ﬁrst analyzing the situation when overall liquidity needs do not
interfere per se with the potential of deposit insurance, i.e. K ≥ L. Then, we contrast these
result with the situation of high overall liquidity needs.
Proposition 4. Let K ≥ L.D e ﬁne ¯ Ti(s)=( −1)min{θi(R−1),(πiR−1)}.I n v e s t m e n to n
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i(s) <N− L iﬀ θi < πiR−1
R−1 for some i such that πi > ¯ π.
Proposition 5. Let L>K .D e ﬁne ¯ Ti(s)=( −1)min{θi(R − 1),(πiR − 1)}.
221. Suppose
PN
i>N−M ¯ Ti(s) ≤
PN−M
i>L (πiR − 1).T h e n ,
PN
i=1 x1
i(s)=N − L.F u r t h e r m o r e ,





i(s)=N − L, s.th. given {x1
i(s)}N
i=1
















i>N−M ¯ Ti(s) >
PN−M
i>L (πiR − 1). Then, investment on individual islands at
t =1is uniquely characterized by the investment functions of Proposition 4., where πK




N − L and there is an island i s.th. θi <
πiR−1
R−1 and πi > ¯ π.
In the case of low liquidity needs (K ≥ L), the distribution of asset shocks still de-
termines which islands keep their funds invested. Furthermore, the optimal contract again
separates the means for liquidity provision and insurance against asset shocks. Unlike in
Proposition 2. the cut-oﬀ point for investment at t =1 , however, depends now on the joint
distribution of shocks. If for some island i with πi > ¯ π the liquidity shock is too small relative
to the collateral shock, the island has an incentive to leave any contract that imposes trans-
fer payments that are too high. Hence, overall transfers to islands with adverse collateral
shocks are too small to achieve full investment. The unique cut-oﬀ point and, hence, the total
amount of investment depends on the maximal transfer compatible with inter-island enforce-
ment, which in turn is a function of the state s. Aggregate uncertainty arises endogenously
through the enforcement limitations between islands, even though the economy as a whole
is not exposed to uncertainty with respect to either the asset shocks or the liquidity shocks
separately.
23For L>Kall results remain qualitatively the same. The only diﬀerence is an inde-
terminacy of how funds get invested across islands whenever maximal transfers are feasible.
Corollary 5. If K ≥ L the optimal inter-island contract features interbank lending and
deposit insurance. Otherwise, any optimal inter-island contract features interbank lending or
deposit insurance or both.
Corollary 6. If maxθi∈Θθi → 0, x1
i(s) → 0 for all i s.th. πi < ¯ π.
Corollary 7. For any πi ≥ ¯ π,
∂|¯ Ti|
∂θi ≥ 0 where ¯ Ti(s)=( −1)min{θi(R − 1),(πiR − 1)}.
Furthermore, suppose θi ≥ πiR−1
R−1 for all πi > ¯ π.T h e n ,i n v e s t m e n ta tt =1for any optimal
inter-island contract satisﬁes Equation 15 with equality.
Corollaries 5. to 7. demonstrate that liquidity shocks serve as a “threat point” to keep
islands from leaving the contract. As long as there are strictly positive liquidity shocks some
insurance against collateral shocks is in principle possible even if enforcement among islands
is limited. In the absence of liquidity shocks - θi =0for all i -,however, limited enforcement
among islands results in zero inter-island transfers: ¯ Ti =0for all i and feasible {x1
i(s)}N
i=1.
This stands in sharp contrast to Corollary 4.. If full enforcement between islands can
be guaranteed, liquidity needs are inessential for the feasibility of deposit insurance. Here
one can always extract all surplus from borrowers with valuable collateral and, hence, the
maximum amount of transfers can achieve full investment for all i s.th. πi > πK independent
of the liquidity shock.
Paradoxically, if inter-island enforcement is limited, a negative correlation between
both shocks helps to increase investment. The higher the liquidity needs on islands with
24good collateral shocks, the more transfers are available for deposit insurance. Thus, once
again, the joint distribution of both shocks is the crucial element in determining overall
investment at t =1 . Provided liquidity is high enough on all islands with πi ≥ ¯ π,o p t i m a l
contracts with and without full inter-island enforcement coincide.
D. Example
The theoretical analysis developed two key results: Liquidity needs are crucial to
support ex post insurance transfers and the joint distribution of shocks determines the exact
structure of the optimal contract. To illustrate the importance of liquidity needs we consider
an example where all islands receive the same liquidity shock. Later, we will modify the
example and allow for island-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in the liquidity shock to study the importance
of the joint distribution.
Suppose that N =3 , R =1 .4, Π = {0.8,0.65,0.5} and Θ = {a,a,a} where a ∈
{0,0.1,0.3}. These parameters are chosen such that the overall liquidity needs do not inter-
fere with the general feasibility of deposit insurance. The next table describes the eﬃcient
investment allocations and transfer schemes for every aggregate liquidity level.
25i =1 i =2 i =3
π1 =0 .8 π2 =0 .65 π3 =0 .5
π1R =1 .12 π2R =0 .91 π3R =0 .7





















Θ = {0.3,0.3,0.3} T1 = −0.12 T2 =0 .09 T3 =0 .03
Table 1: Investment and Transfers for Diﬀerent Levels of Liquidity Shocks
In the full enforcement case, the level of investment depends on the amount of transfers
that can be extracted from island 1 - the only island where πiR>1 - and the subsidy required
to support investment on islands 2 and 3. As illustrated in Proposition 2., this is not a
general property but results from the fact that the aggregate liquidity shocks (
P3
i=1 θi ≤ 0.9)
are not high enough to interfere with the optimal transfer schedule. Hence, for this example,
aggregate investment remains the same for all three levels of the liquidity shock considered.
As can be seen from Table 1, the investment levels for the no inter-island enforcement
case depend upon the level of liquidity shocks. In the absence of liquidity shocks (a =0 ),
there is no interbank insurance. As a result, no investment occurs on islands 2 and 3, leading
to lower aggregate investment. As liquidity shocks increase, the amount of insurance that
can be supported also increases. Provided liquidity needs are suﬃciently high (a =0 .3)t h e
investment allocations implemented in the no-enforcement case are identical to those of the
full enforcement case.
26The above example can be easily adapted to illustrate the key role the realized joint
distribution plays. Suppose that Θ = {0,0.1,0.3}, where the other parameter values remain
unchanged. Then, there are 3! = 6 possible realizations. The allocations and transfers for
each of these possible realizations are given in Table 2 below.
i =1 i =2 i =3
π1 =0 .8 π2 =0 .65 π3 =0 .5





Full Enforcement T1 = −0.12 T2 =0 .09 T3 =0 .03
Inter-Island
No Enforcement




θ1 =0 ,θ2 =0 .3,θ3 =0 .1 T1 =0 T2 =0 T3 =0




θ1 =0 .1,θ2 =0 .3,θ3 =0 T1 = −0.04 T2 =0 .04 T3 =0




θ1 =0 .3,θ2 =0 ,θ3 =0 .1 T1 = −0.12 T2 =0 .09 T3 =0 .04
Table 2: Investment and Transfers for Diﬀerent Joint Distributions and Θ = {0,0.1,0.3}
With full enforcement between islands the joint distribution of liquidity and asset
shocks is irrelevant. With limited enforcement, however, the overall level of investment de-
pends upon the joint distribution. In this example, the liquidity shock realized for island 1 -
the only island from which transfers can potentially be extracted - determines the extent of
interbank insurance which in turn determines the amount of investment that can be subsi-
dized on the other islands with bad collateral shocks. The lower liquidity needs are on island
1, the lower is the threat of exclusion from interbank lending markets and, hence, the lower
is the quantity of transfers that can be extracted from island 1 to subsidize projects on other
islands. For a speciﬁc joint distribution the islands are able to achieve the ﬁrst-best level of
investments, whereas for others they are unable to do so. Thus, islands now face aggregate
27uncertainty that arises endogenously from the fact that the joint distribution matters for
overall investment.
5. Discussion
The theoretical model analyzed above characterizes optimal interactions between banks.
In particular, we illustrate a channel which can induce banks to provide mutual interbank
asset insurance in the absence of institutions explicitly guaranteeing enforcement. Speciﬁ-
cally, the cost of exclusion from interbank lending markets provides an incentive for banks
to coinsure one another in the face of asset shocks. This illustrates our main message that
interbank arrangements for asset insurance can be supported by the need for interbank loans
to meet stochastic liquidity demands. An interesting feature of these interbank arrangements
is that they lead to endogenous aggregate uncertainty, as the level of interbank transfers -
and hence the level of investment - is dependent upon the realized joint distribution of asset
and liquidity shocks.
It is crucial to understand not only how asset and liquidity shocks translate into the
particular form of insurance provided among banks, but also why and when these shocks cause
banks to fail. Collateral shocks combined with the assumption that projects are inherently
“good” imply that insurance can improve welfare by increasing the level of investment. The
objective of deposit insurance is then to encourage banks to undertake loans which otherwise
would not have been undertaken due to the risk of insolvency.17
17As earlier noted by Kocherlakota (1999), an optimally designed insurance system should be characterized
by a positive level of “bank failures” - that is, there should be positive transfers to institutions whose liabilities
to depositors exceed the value of assets. This observation also sheds diﬀerent light on the large payouts made
by public deposit insurance systems during the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S. and other countries. In particular,
it suggests that these large payments may have been at least partially eﬃcient.
28In our framework, potential bank failures are always triggered by the insolvency of
banks arising from shocks to their assets and the information depositors receive about it,
rather than by random liquidity demand of depositors.18 The model, therefore, provides
further support for the view that liquidity shocks do not provide a motive for insurance
among banks to prevent bank failures. Rather, as pointed out by Chari (1989), a functioning
interbank lending system is suﬃcient to deal with liquidity shocks. The presence of liquidity
shocks, nevertheless, plays an important role in our framework. Interbank lending essentially
allows for a relocation of deposits from potentially insolvent banks to solvent banks. Solvent
banks have to rely on this form of interbank lending to cope with liquidity needs. Therefore, in
a situation where insurance payments against asset shocks cannot be enforced explicitly, the
need for liquidity provides a counterbalancing force that limits reneging on ex-post insurance
transfers.
It is precisely this interaction between the two shocks that can help to explain some of
the features of interbank cooperation mentioned earlier in the introduction. In our framework
individual banks do not fail due to a bank speciﬁc run unless they are insolvent. Other banks
will lend to provide liquidity in exchange for asset insurance. Moreover, if the aggregate
level of liquidity needs increases, cooperation among banks is facilitated since enforcement
problems are mitigated. This implies that interbank cooperation functions best exactly in
the case of system wide liquidity crises. To the contrary, an increase in the overall level of
18There is an increasing empirical and theoretical literature stressing this important distinction and its
implications. Empirical studies that conﬁrm the information based theory of bank runs are provided for
example by Calomiris and Mason (1997) and Calomiris and Gorton (1991) for bank runs during the Great
Depression and by Schumacher (2000) for the crisis of the Argentine banking system in 1995. All these studies
are in particular relevant for our context since they cover situations where public regulation and safety nets
were absent or very limited, and could, therefore, have potentially given rise to the theory of random liquidity
demand.
29asset shocks threatens mutual insurance among banks by worsening the commitment problem.
Hence, systemic banking crises are always induced through shocks to the banks’ assets. These
shocks, however, have to occur across all banks in our model to precipitate a system-wide
crisis: Asymmetric shocks to only a few banks might limit the amount of insurance provided
to these banks, but will not put the cooperation based banking system per se at risk.
Moreover, considering safety net systems, governments can play a crucial role in their
eﬃcient design by oﬀsetting enforcement limitations. Our ﬁndings also suggest a possible
explanation for why government mandated deposit insurance systems have supplanted inter-
bank insurance arrangements in most countries. In light of our model, the explanations are
that either asset risk increased or the provision of liquidity needs moved away from interbank
lending to anonymous liquidity markets or even central banks, both of which made existing
interbank insurance arrangements less eﬀective.
The model here provides a framework which can be extended so as to analyze a number
of policy related questions. One such question is linked to bank runs caused by depositors who
lack appropriate information concerning the bank’s asset portfolio. It would be possible to
enrich the model by introducing an assymetry of information between banks and individual
lenders, and analyzing whether banks are able to avoid a run via the type of cooperation
introduced in this paper.19 Obviously, a related question would be the possibility of ﬁnancial
contagion caused by shocks originating on the asset side. Finally, it appears intriguing to
incorporate moral hazard with respect to the banks’ investment decisions into the model.
This extension would permit one to endogenize the choice of banking regulation, weighing
19Several sources (e.g. Gorton (1985) and Calomiris and Mason (1997)) identify examples that support
this view.
30the cost and beneﬁts of public regulation against private cooperation.
Several short remarks concerning our theoretical approach are in order. First, the
optimal inter-island contract is in general not coalition-proof or - in other words - not en-
forceable against multi-player deviations. For coalition-proof contracts, the scope of insurance
is generally limited, as the “threat point” feature of liquidity needs is partially mitigated. 20
Second, repeating the environment obviously reduces the enforcement problem among is-
lands. However, unless reputation eﬀects are strong enough, the problem stays qualitatively
the same.
6. Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1.
Proof. Setting δ
V
i (s) equal to 1 relaxes the borrowers’ participation constraints (4) and (5)
independently of x0
i and x1
i(s). Since the collateral good is valued only by borrowers, δ
V
i (s)=1
for all i =1 ,...,N is optimal. By hypothesis, the borrowers’ participation constraint (4)
does, then, not bind for any x0
i ∈ [0,1]. Hence, lenders are always able to withdraw their
funds at stage t =1after they observe the realization of ˜ πi and ˜ θi.S i n c ex0
i =1initiates the
maximum number of potentially proﬁtable projects, the result follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1.
Proof. Since all the constraints of problem P2 are speciﬁed as functions of the state s,
the problem for island i can be decomposed into a separate problem for each island-speciﬁc
20For example, take all the islands that are liquidated due to liquidity needs and some island i with
realization Rπi > 1. Suppose further the optimal contract speciﬁes implicitly at least some insurance, which
implies that some other island j receives funds that are extracted from island i. However, island i could
obtain insurance against its liquidity needs from the liquidated islands for an arbitrary small positive fee.
31realization of ˜ πi and ˜ θi. Lemma 1. implies that constraint 4 does not bind. To satisfy the
participation constraint (2), a fraction θi of investment has to be withdrawn at stage t =1 .
Thus, x1
i(s) ≤ 1 − θi, which implies that for N =1equation (7) holds.
By assumption 1., V> Rand equation (5) never binds. Let equations (2), (3) and













B,i(s) ≤ (πiR − 1)x
1
i(s). (19)
Suppose now that πiR<1.T h e nx1




If πiR ≥ 1,e v e r yx1
i(s) ∈ [0,1 − θi] is feasible. Since the objective function is strictly
increasing in cV
B,i(s) and c0
B,i(s), which are increasing in x1
i(s),i ti so p t i m a lt os e tx1
i(s)=1 −θi.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1.
Proof. Using the investment levels of Proposition 1., one immediately obtains the con-
sumption allocations from the feasibility and participation constraints.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Proof. Follows immediately from the investment levels of Proposition 1..
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
Proof. By Lemma 1. δ
V
i (s)=1and x0
i =1for all i =1 ,...,N.
32Let K ≥ L. To verify feasibility of investment levels, set ct
L,i(s)=1 ,f o rt =1 ,2,
c0
B,i(s)=Rx1
i(s) and substitute the investment functions into equations (7) and (8) to obtain
N X
i=1




































[πiR − 1]. (22)
The deﬁnition of K implies
PN
i>K [πiR − 1] = 0, and, hence, feasibility at t =2is
satisﬁed with cV
B,i(s)=0for all i =1 ,...,N.
Next, we have to verify the optimality of the contract. Increasing cV
B,i(s) for any i -o r
reducing x1
i(s) for some island i - without increasing investment for some other island reduces








1 − ² for some n s.th. πn ≥ πK








(πiR − 1) + (1 − ²)(πnR − 1) + ²(πmR − 1) < 0. (23)
33Hence, for some i, cV
B,i(s) < 0. Therefore, to satisfy feasibility investment has to be
reduced further for some island i with ¯ π > πi > πK. This reduces overall investment and,
hence, the value of the objective function.
Let L>K .S i n c e
P
{i|i>L} (πR − 1) > 0, replacing K by L in the case above proves
that N −L is the optimal overall investment level. There are many investment functions that
can achieve this overall level (for example set x1
i(s)=1for all i s.th. πi > πL). The only
requirement is that investment yields enough surplus - to be extracted from borrowers with
valuable collateral - to pay oﬀ late lenders.





L,i(s)=1for all i,a tl e a s t
PN
i=1 c2
L,i = N−L resources have to be provided in extractable






















i(s) ≥ 0. (25)
Then, equation (25) together with an overall investment level of N − L characterize
optimal investment.
Proof of Corollary 3.
Proof. Let K ≥ L. Since Proposition 2. has x1
i(s) > 1 − θi for all i s.th. πi > πK,w eh a v e





−(πiR − 1) if πi > ¯ π
(πiR − 1) if πK ≤ πi ≤ ¯ π
0 if πi < πK
.
34It follows immediately that this deposit insurance system uniquely implements the
investment levels of Proposition 2. for all i s.th. ¯ π > πi > πK.
Let L>K . Suppose there exists an optimal contract without interbank lending
and without deposit insurance system. Then, by absence of interbank lending, we have
x1
i(s) ≤ 1 − θi for all i. Also, since there is no deposit insurance system, x1
i(s)=0for all i













(1 − θi) <N− L, (26)
contradicting Proposition 2..
Proof of Corollary 4.
Proof. Follows immediately from the investment levels of Proposition 2..
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Proof. Lemma 1. applies again. Equation 15 follows then immediately from Proposition 2.
since the set of feasible investment functions of problem P1 is a subset of those of problem
P3.
Dependence on the overall level of liquidity needs and the joint distribution are a direct
consequence of Propositions 4. and 5. which are proved below.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
Proof. Suppose K ≥ L. It is clear from Proposition 2. that x1
i(s)=1for all i s.th.
πi ≥ ¯ π and x1
i(s)=0for all i s.th. πi ≤ πK. Since the objective function is increasing
in the number of projects funded, it is optimal to fund as many projects on islands with
πK < πi < ¯ π as possible. The possibility of funding projects on these islands depends on the
35maximal amount of transfers that can be extracted from islands with πi ≥ ¯ π. It follows - by
an identical argument to that used in the proof of Proposition 2. - that Equation 16 holds
with equality for a unique ˜ π and ˜ xi.
Suppose ∃ some i s.th. πi > ¯ π and θi < πiR−1
R−1 . Then, for any feasible {Ti}N
i=1,








Hence, to satisfy Equation 16, x1




Conversely, if θi ≥ πiR−1





P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
Proof. To prove part 1, let L ≥ N − M. Then, x1
i(s)=1for all i with πi > πL
is feasible and optimal, since at least an equivalent of L islands have to be liquidated to
satisfy overall liquidity needs. For N − M>L ,s e tx1
i(s)=1for all i s.th. πi ≥ ¯ π.S i n c e
PN
i>N−M ¯ Ti(s) ≤
PN−M
i>L (πiR − 1), by using transfer schemes for these island as speciﬁed in
Corollary 3., x1
i(s)=1for all i with ¯ π > πi > πL is feasible. Since
PN
i=1 x1
i(s)=N −L,t h e s e
investment levels are optimal.





i(s)=N−L. If condition (17) is satisﬁed
for these investment levels, they are feasible. Since total investment equals N − L,t h e ya r e
optimal by the argument given above.
36Part 2 applies only to N − M>L , since otherwise the initial restriction of part 2
in the statement of the proposition is meaningless. The proof of uniqueness of the optimal
investment functions on individual islands is analogous to the argument used in the proof of
Proposition 4.. Again, the amount of investment on islands with ¯ π > πi > πL depends on




Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
PN
i=1 x1
i(s)=N − L. Uniqueness and form
of the optimal investment levels implies that x1
i(s)=1for all i s.th. πi > πL. To ensure







(πiR − 1). (29)
This contradicts the initial condition of part 2.
Finally, suppose, by way of contradiction, that θi > πiR−1
R−1 for all πi > ¯ π.T h e n , b y
Lemma 2.,
PN
i>N−M ¯ Ti(s) ≤
PN−M
i>L (πiR − 1). This contradicts the initial condition of part 2
and, hence, the ﬁnal statement of the proposition follows.
Proof of Corollary 5.
Proof. Follows from the speciﬁcation of optimal investment levels given in Proposition 4.
and 5. and the proof of Corollary 3..
Proof of Corollary 6.
Proof. Follows from the investment levels given in Proposition 4. and 5..
Proof of Corollary 7.
37Proof. The ﬁrst result is obvious. The second result follows from the fact that θi ≥ πiR−1
R−1
for all πi > ¯ π implies ¯ Ti = πiR − 1 for all i s.th. πi ≥ ¯ π.
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Figure 1: Timing of Events